Towards an Intellectual Property Agreement in the GATT: View from the Private Sector by Bilzi, Carol J.
TRADE CONFERENCE
TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT
IN THE GATT: VIEW FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Carol J Bilzi, Esq. *
I. PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
Developments in the Uruguay Round, more so than in any previous
round of multilateral trade negotiations, will affect profoundly the
structure and operation of global business, especially in the three
areas not addressed in earlier rounds-intellectual property, services,
and investment. Given the importance of these "new" issues to the
business community, the U.S. private sector has assumed an active
role in the Uruguay Round negotiations. In fact, the search for
improved international intellectual property protection in the GATT
has been driven primarily by the private sector. It is the business
community and not the Government that has extensive experience
with the economic consequences of inadequate intellectual property
protection. Thus, the private sector has sought to share its experience
and expertise with U.S. Government negotiators in order to develop
a comprehensive agreement that will address the problems faced by
U.S. industries.
Through the Intellectual Property Committee, the U.S. private
sector has developed a coordinated position on intellectual property
issues, has worked closely with U.S. government officials and ne-
gotiators to promote business interests, and has marshaled interna-
tional support for its position. Largely as a result of private sector
involvement, the area of intellectual property has evolved in the
Uruguay Round from an obscure issue that was not widely recognized
as a proper topic for the GATT prior to the September 1986 Punta
del Este meeting to one of the most significant and closely watched
issues in the Round.
II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE
Established in March, 1986, The Intellectual Property Committee
("IPC") is an ad-hoc coalition of twelve major U.S. corporations
representing the entire spectrum of industries concerned about intel-
lectual property protection. The members of the IPC are Bristol-
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Myers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General Electric, Hewlett-Pack-
ard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell
International, and Warner Communications. The IPC is dedicated
to the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on intellectual prop-
erty in the current GATT multilateral trade negotiations.
One of the IPC's initial objectives was to ensure the inclusion of
intellectual property on the negotiating agenda for the Uruguay Round.
In the six months between the IPC's formation and the GATT
Ministerial Meeting at Punta del Este where the Uruguay Round was
launched, the IPC worked to develop and mobilize an international
private sector consensus in support of including intellectual property
in the new Round. In the summer of 1986, IPC delegations met with
European and Japanese business groups to gain their support and
urge them to contact their respective governments. As a result, the
Ministerial Declaration that emerged from Punta del Este contains
a broad negotiating mandate for intellectual property. In addition,
the IPC worked closely with members of Congress and their staffs
to ensure that Congress would provide the President with strong and
explicit trade negotiating authority for intellectual property. The Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 mandates as a principal
U.S. negotiating objective the improved foreign protection and en-
forcement of U.S. intellectual property rights.
During the two years following Punta del Este, the IPC worked
with European and Japanese business groups to develop an inter-
national private sector consensus on what should be included in a
GATT intellectual property agreement. Japanese and European in-
dustries are motivated by similar concerns, having shared in the
billions of dollars of losses experienced by U.S. companies as a result
of piracy and counterfeiting. Moreover, the potential for economic
harm continues to grow due to the increasing interdependence of the
global economy. This cooperative effort culminated in June 1988 in
the publication of a trilateral report by the IPC, the Union of
Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe ("UNICE"),
and the Keidanren, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations.
The document sets forth a detailed framework for a GATT agreement
on intellectual property. Such unity among the three business com-
munities is unprecedented: as the Financial Times noted, "the intel-
lectual property initiative marked the first time that industries from
the three blocs have worked closely together on joint proposals to
put to governments." Eighteen U.S. trade and intellectual property
associations have endorsed the approach set forth in the trilateral
report. The trilateral consensus was communicated to the U.S., Jap-
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anese, and European Governments and to the EC Commission, whose
official negotiating positions track closely the approach advocated in
the trilateral document. As a result of concerted private sector pres-
sure, the United States, the EC, and Japan have taken the lead in
the GATT intellectual property negotiations.
III. THE NEED FOR A GATT AGREEMENT ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
A. Inadequate Intellectual Property Protection Distorts and
Restricts International Trade
The business community's leadership role in the quest for increased
intellectual property protection is not surprising in light of the billions
of dollars of losses that U.S. industries have suffered as a result of
counterfeiting, piracy, and infringement. The U.S. International Trade
Commission estimates that in 1986, alone, U.S. industries lost from
$43 to $61 billion world-wide due to inadequate intellectual property
protection. The loss of export and domestic markets by intellectual
property-based industries demonstrates that the lack of intellectual
property protection has become a significant barrier to trade. There
is a direct link between the protection of intellectual property rights
and U.S. international competitiveness. United States companies sim-
ply will not have the incentive to invest in research and development
unless they can reap the financial benefits of developing new tech-
nology. As worldwide infringement increases, it becomes more dif-
ficult for industries to achieve an economic return on innovative
products and designs. Infringers, who do not have similar development
costs, displace legitimately produced goods from international mar-
kets. For example, a new generation of semiconductors can cost $100
million or more to design, yet the same chips can be copied for less
than $1 million. A popular U.S. software package which costs $500
here, has been copied and sold abroad for $7.50.
B. Adequate and Effective Intellectual Property Protection Will
Benefit All Countries
Protecting intellectual property is not an issue that should divide
countries based on their levels of development. Adequate and effective
intellectual property protection is beneficial to both developed and
developing countries alike. Particularly with respect to developing
countries, increased protection will encourage and reward innovation
by domestic firms, provide incentive for the development of inter-
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nationally competitive industries, promote increased foreign invest-
ment and transfer of technology, and prevent a "brain drain" by
which local inventors and entrepreneurs frustrated by their country's
lack of adequate protection migrate to more developed countries.
Whatever may be the short-term benefits of imitation and "free-
riding" on advances made elsewhere, in the long-term, such a strategy
condemns a country to outdated technology and a second-class status.
More and more countries are recognizing that the growth and success
of their domestic industries is jeopardized by inadequate intellectual
property protection. For example, China recently strengthened its
domestic intellectual property laws to protect its infant computer
software industry. Even in countries where piracy has been a severe
problem, such as Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore, efforts have
been made to improve intellectual property protection.
C. Existing Intellectual Property Regimes Are Not Effective In
Addressing Trade Distortions
While there are international intellectual property regimes in place,
such as the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention
for copyrights, and the Paris Convention for patents and trademarks,
they simply have not been effective in stopping the tremendous losses
suffered by industries due to counterfeiting and piracy. Many of these
existing conventions fail to provide minimum standards of protection.
Often, parties are only required to provide national treatment, which
translates into no protection for foreigners when a country's domestic
laws do not adequately protect local owners of intellectual property
rights. In addition, these conventions do not contain adequate dispute
settlement provisions or enforcement mechanisms.
As a result of the deficiencies of existing intellectual property
regimes, governments will continue to turn to bilateral and unilateral
solutions to the problem. For example, the United States recently
denied preferential tariff treatment to Thailand under the Generalized
System of Preferences citing Thailand's failure to provide adequate
protection of intellectual property. The United States has already used
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to combat inadequate intellectual
property protection abroad. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 contains special procedures to identify countries that
have inadequate intellectual property protection or that deny market
access to U.S. products dependent upon intellectual property pro-
tection. The new provision authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative
to initiate unfair trade practices investigations against those countries
that are the worst offenders.
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Increased bilateralism is harmful to weaker countries, which rely
on the multilateral system to discipline those that are more powerful.
Bilateral arrangements do not take into account the interests of those
not a party to a particular negotiation or settlement, and such ar-
rangements are likely to lead to barriers to legitimate trade. In con-
trast, all trading partners, large and small, industrialized and
developing, stand to gain from a comprehensive multilateral agree-
ment on intellectual property.
IV. THE TRILATERAL FRAMEwoRK FOR A GATT AGREEMENT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPED BY THE IPC, UNICE, AND
THE KEIDANREN
The 100-page document agreed to by the three business groups,
entitled, Basic Framework of GA TT Provisions on Intellectual Prop-
erty, outlines a comprehensive negotiating strategy and a basic frame-
work for a GATT agreement. The Framework advocates the negotiation
of a separate GATT Code on intellectual property, similar to the
Standards and Subsidies Codes negotiated during the last multilateral
round of trade talks. A code would establish rights and obligations
only among its signatories. Thus, those countries with a common
interest in eliminating trade distortions would quickly be able to enter
into an agreement, and not be "held hostage" to the demands and
stalling tactics of pirates and counterfeiters.
The three essential elements of a GATT agreement on intellectual
property are: (1) strong enforcement mechanisms; (2) fundamental
substantive principles of intellectual property protection; and (3) mul-
tilateral consultation and dispute settlement procedures. Any intel-
lectual property agreement resulting from the Uruguay Round that
does not contain these three key elements would not be effective.
A. Strong Enforcement Mechanisms
Enforcement is a crucial element of a GATT agreement on intel-
lectual property. The inadequacy of existing intellectual property
regimes can be attributed in large part to their lack of enforcement
and dispute settlement mechanisms. The trilateral agreement includes
a two-tiered system of domestic enforcement: (1) border controls
under domestic trade laws and (2) remedies under intellectual property
laws. A two-tiered enforcement mechanism would effectively deal
with infringers, pirates, and counterfeiters, regardless of the locus of
their infringing activities.
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1. Border measures.
Border measures provide a remedy to a holder of an intellectual
property right against infringing imports. A party to a GATT agree-
ment on intellectual property-that is, a government-would be re-
quired to provide effective procedures under which intellectual property
holders could request their government to restrict the importation of
infringing goods at the border, and these procedures would have to
be provided before the goods enter the domestic stream of commerce.
Border controls would be particularly effective because they would
extend the effects of a GATT agreement to infringing imports from
countries that are not parties to the agreement. In other words, by
using domestic laws, intellectual property holders would be able to
protect domestic markets from infringing imports from any country,
regardless of whether or not the source country were a party to the
GATT intellectual property agreement. Many countries already have
border controls in place to protect their domestic markets from
infringing imports (for example, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930 in the United States and Article 21 of the Customs Tariff Law
of 1910 in Japan).
2. Domestic intellectual property laws.
A party to a GATT agreement on intellectual property would also
be required to provide effective procedures and adequate remedies
against infringement under its domestic laws. In the event an owner
of an intellectual property right in a signatory country is confronted
with an infringing good that has either been produced locally or
imported, the owner would be able to use domestic judicial and
administrative procedures to stop the infringement. The use of do-
mestic intellectual property laws is generally the most effective way
to stop the local production of infringing goods before they enter
both the domestic and international streams of commerce and, in the
case of infringing imports, to stop the goods after they clear the
border.
B. Fundamental Substantive Principles of Intellectual Property
Protection
The second key element of a GATT agreement is fundamental
substantive principles or minimum standards of intellectual property
protection. Fundamental substantive principles would provide a ref-
erence point for countries joining the agreement to determine the
adequacy of their domestic laws, and they would provide guidelines
for consultation and dispute settlement proceedings.
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The fundamental principles should be drawn from existing domestic
laws and existing international intellectual property agreements to the
extent that these agreements provide adequate minimum standards
of protection. For example, the Berne Convention is a good model
for the fundamental principles of copyright, while the Paris Con-
vention is not a good model for patents.
The establishment of fundamental principles is not an exercise in
harmonization. Those national systems that already contain adequate
intellectual property protection would not have to change their laws.
The objective is to bring the level of protection in those countries
that currently have inadequate protection up to the floor established
by the fundamental principles. The three business groups worked
closely with intellectual property lawyers and other experts to develop
a model set of fundamental principles covering six areas: patents,
copyrights, semiconductor chip layouts, trademarks, industrial de-
signs, and trade secrets.
C. Multilateral Consultation and Dispute Settlement Procedures
The third essential element of a GATT agreement on intellectual
property is consultation and dispute settlement procedures. In effect,
these procedures would be the third tier of the enforcement system.
If an owner of intellectual property in a signatory country is unable
to obtain adequate and effective protection because another signatory
country fails to carry out its obligations under a GATT agreement
on intellectual property, the owner's government would be able to
invoke the consultation and dispute settlement mechanism of the
agreement. An effective dispute settlement mechanism would subject
the parties to an agreement to multilateral scrutiny and would reduce
the use of bilateral and unilateral actions to protect intellectual prop-
erty rights.
This ability to bring other parties before a multilateral institution
to resolve disputes distinguishes an intellectual property agreement
under the GATT framework from existing international intellectual
property agreements administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"). Agreements such as the Berne Convention
and the Paris Convention have no "teeth" because they lack en-
forcement mechanisms.
D. Special Considerations for Countries Without Adequate
Protection
Developing countries that become parties to a GATT agreement
on intellectual property should be permitted to delay implementation
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of the fundamental principles of protection for a reasonable but
specifically limited period of time. This period would permit them
to bring their national laws into conformity with the fundamental
principles and to deal with any economic dislocation directly due to
this adherence. While transitional rules may be appropriate, it would
be counterproductive to have a different set of fundamental principles
of protection for developing countries. This would defeat the purpose
of the agreement and establish two separate levels of protection.
In order to encourage developing countries to join, developed
countries party to a GATT agreement could pledge to increase their
funding for technical assistance to developing countries to expedite
the adoption and implementation of minimum standards. A system
of consultations could be developed so that parties to the GATT
agreement on intellectual property could consult with non-parties and
explain the benefits of the improved protection provided by the
agreement. Parties to the GATT intellectual property agreement could
also develop procedures that would link continued access to their
markets to improved protection of intellectual property.
V. FUTURE IPC WORK PROGRAM
Recognizing that nothing will be accomplished in the GATT with-
out, at the least, the support of Japan, the European Community,
and the United States, the IPC's efforts have focused primarily on
gaining support for its framework in these three countries. One of
the most important tasks that lies ahead is to extend the tripartite
consensus to private sector groups in other countries, including other
developed countries, newly industrialized countries, and developing
countries. In order to gain support for the agreement, the IPC will
seek to demonstrate to newly industrialized and developing countries
the linkage between effective intellectual property protection and
economic development and growth. Together with Japanese and Eur-
opean business representatives, the IPC will encourage other business
groups to support the trilateral framework agreement and to com-
municate to their governments their interest in a comprehensive in-
tellectual property agreement in the GATT. As the trilateral experience
demonstrates, agreements developed in the private sector can con-
tribute significantly to the impetus for government-to-government
negotiation and agreement.
The IPC is optimistic about the outcome of the intellectual property
negotiations in the Uruguay Round. Those countries that have an
interest in the international trading system and the expansion of world
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trade are increasingly recognizing the benefits of a comprehensive
multilateral agreement to protect intellectual property rights. Many
less developed and newly industrialized countries have upgraded their
protection of intellectual property or are in the process of doing so.
Failure to reach a consensus on a comprehensive intellectual property
agreement will result in the proliferation of bilateral and unilateral
actions. As more countries commit themselves to a strong multilateral
regime, the costs to those left behind will only increase.
Portions of this statement are based on materials prepared by the
Intellectual Property Committee.
